“The strategic and political determinants of Iran’s nuclear policy are complicated and frequently misunderstood. Chubin’s study is the definitive work on the subject and should be required reading for US and European decision-makers as they struggle to prevent the Iranian bomb from becoming a reality.”
—Geoffrey Kemp, Director, Regional Strategic Programs, The Nixon Center
Recently, in an article in Barcelona's newspaper "La Vanguardia", iranian born Shahram Chubin (who is director of studies at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, author also of the recent book "Iran´s nuclear ambitions" (1) - Carnegie Endowment, August 2006) writes about the internal differences in Iran.
According to Chubin:
"the 'novel' about the Iranian nuclear program has been going on for three years already and it does not seem to be getting near any solution. Throughout this time, regional political activists of the country – such as Lebanon's Hezbollah - have threatened to worsen regional stability (and have achieved it indeed), even before Iran becomes a nuclear power. An Iran with nuclear capacity, and more surely nuclear energy, would represent a fearful challenge for western policy and for stability of the region. Iran's answer, when it arrives, is likely to be ambiguous: Iran may accept to negotiate in principle, but will certainly refuse to stop its activities. Without an end to the activities, prolonged negotiations could risk tying the hands of the West to apply sanctions, on the one hand, while allowing technical advances in Iran, on the other hand. Yet, the Iranian nuclear program is not the product of an internal consensus that Iran as a whole has wished to develop."
Chubin claims (well) that the international community has not, regrettably, yet learned how to take advantage of the existing internal political differences in Iran.
He goes on, in the same article, to say that "Those who, in Iran, look for confrontation policies and insist on following ahead with uranium enrichment and reach a nuclear potential, only seek to consolidate their power within the country and to resist the influence of the West. They do not want negotiations nor agreements. They wish for a revolutionary Iran that can be a regional power opposed to western influence."
Iran indeed alarms the world as it aggressively seeks nuclear energy technology that could be used to create weapons. The concern stems in part from Iran’s uncertain intentions and recent history. The real questions however are whether Iran will remain a revolutionary power willing to subvert its Sunni Arab neighbours, destroy Israel or would an Iran with nuclear weapons merely defend its territory from foreign aggression and live in peace with its neighbours? Are the country’s leaders and society willing to negotiate limits on nuclear capability and normalize relations with the West, or will they resist accommodation? In the book "Iran´s nuclear ambitions", Shahram Chubin (2) & (3) takes a look at the motivations, perceptions, and domestic politics inside and around Iran. He reviews the history of the Iranian nuclear program and diplomacy and argues that the problem is not nuclear technology but rather Iran’s behaviour as a' revolutionary' state with ambitions that collide with the interests of its neighbours and the West, in particular.
read the article in spanish:
http://www.almendron.com/tribuna/?p=11132
(1) http://www.brook.edu/press/books/clientpr/carnegie/iransnuclearambitions.htm
(2) http://www.twq.com/03autumn/docs/03autumn_chubin.pdf
(3) http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/IPC/perspex-ipc-whatmakestehrantick-050906.pdf
For a complete history and one of the best updated online sources of Iranian nuclear chronology, see: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1825_4968.html
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